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The Hon Bruce Atkinson MLC The Hon Telmo Languiller MP 
President Speaker 
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House Parliament House 
Melbourne Melbourne 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Emergency Service Response Times.  
The audit assessed how accountable emergency service organisations and the 
departments of Health & Human Services and Justice & Regulation are for their response 
time performance. All of the audited emergency service organisations measure and report 
on emergency response times, except for Victoria Police. 
I found that while response time performance has been largely stable across the past three 
years, the limitations of emergency response time measures, targets, data and reporting 
prevent Parliament and the public from holding agencies fully to account. In particular, I 
found that emergency response time targets are outdated or not based on evidence. This 
means that the arrival of emergency services within their target times does not necessarily 
reflect better practice, optimal service efficiency or improved outcomes. 
Although response times are a relevant component of performance measurement 
frameworks for emergency service delivery, I found that they are not appropriate 
stand-alone measures for overall emergency service performance, and should be 
considered alongside information on outcomes, service quality, efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. 
Yours faithfully 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
19 March 2015  
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Auditor-General’s comments 
We expect emergency services to attend the most urgent calls for help as quickly 
as possible. Sometimes arriving quickly can be the difference between life and 
death.  
Comprehensive and reliable information about emergency response times should 
inform agency management in their operational and resourcing decisions. It should 
also provide a reliable basis to inform Government budget and policy decisions. 
Ultimately, the public look to information on emergency services’ performance to 
gain confidence that they will get a timely response when needed, and that 
agencies will take action to improve performance where required.  
This is why measuring, monitoring and reporting response times for our emergency 
services is so important—not only to drive performance but also provide assurance 
and confidence that these services are reliable. 
Given the critical importance of emergency response times, this audit looked at the 
response time performance and measures for our key emergency services 
including Ambulance Victoria (AV), the Country Fire Authority, the Metropolitan Fire 
and Emergency Services Board (MFESB), the Victoria State Emergency Service 
and Victoria Police. In particular, the audit looked at whether the measures being 
used to report response times are relevant and appropriate, whether the data being 
used is reliable and what reported information actually tells us about performance.  
I found that the emergency response time measures reported in State Budget 
Papers and agency annual reports do not provide useful performance information. 
Targets for the number of minutes to arrive are outdated or not based on evidence. 
Measures are often narrowly defined and exclude significant proportions of 
emergency response activity. Data quality is not assured in a number of instances, 
and Victoria Police does not measure its response times at all. 
There is limited public reporting of performance measures. Only MFESB has 
routinely reported the actual number of minutes it takes to respond to urgent calls 
to the public. A focus on reporting high level statewide data only also means that 
there is little understanding of how performance varies across Victoria.  
These findings echo those of a recent audit examining Public Sector Performance 
Measurement and Reporting, which found that performance reporting in budget 
papers and annual reports was impenetrable and lacked meaningful commentary 
on performance. Similarly, the limitations of emergency response time measures, 
targets, data and reporting make it impossible for the public and Parliament to fully 
and clearly understand response time performance.  
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Jacquie Stepanoff 
Team Leader 
Matthew Irons 
Senior Analyst 
Karen Ellingford 
Jason Cullen 
David Moore 
Analysts 
Engagement Quality 
Control Reviewer 
Kate Kuring 
Auditor-General’s comments 
viii       Emergency Service Response Times Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
      
 
 
 
Despite some weaknesses in how response time data is recorded and reported, it 
does fairly represent actual performance. The data indicates that emergency 
response times have remained relatively stable at the statewide level over the past 
three years, although there is variation in performance across different regions.  
However, it is important to remember that response times are not an overall 
measure of emergency service performance. Other measures such as health 
outcomes for ambulance patients, containment of building fires, and community 
satisfaction are necessary to build a holistic view of effectiveness.  
To represent the important work that emergency services perform fairly, response 
time measures and reporting need urgent review. I urge departments and 
emergency services to work together to develop evidence-based, appropriate 
response time measures and to report on these in a way that government, the 
Parliament and the public can understand, rely upon and use.  
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
March 2015 
 Victorian Auditor-General’s Report Emergency Service Response Times    ix 
Audit summary 
Background 
The speed of response to an emergency, such as a fire or road accident, can have a 
significant effect on the outcome. A delayed response can have life-changing health, 
welfare and economic consequences that may otherwise have been avoided. Citizens 
expect a prompt response to an emergency call and want to know how long the 
response is likely to take. Emergency service response time information is therefore 
important to the community and is also necessary to inform government decision-
making.  
Four of Victoria's emergency service organisations (ESO)—Ambulance Victoria (AV), 
the Country Fire Authority (CFA), the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
(MFESB) and the Victoria State Emergency Service (SES)—have emergency 
response time performance measures. These measures include targets for the 
proportion of responses that will take place within specified time frames. Performance 
is published in agency annual reports and State Budget papers and underpins the 
funding provided to the Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) and the 
Department of Justice & Regulation (DJR) that is passed on to ESOs.  
The fifth ESO, Victoria Police does not have an emergency response time measure or 
report publicly on the timeliness of its responses to calls for assistance. 
 
From left to right: Photographs courtesy of Ambulance Victoria, the Country Fire Authority, 
the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board, the Victoria State Emergency Service 
and ChameleonsEye / Shutterstock.com. 
The objective of this audit was to determine whether agencies are accountable for 
emergency response time performance by considering whether they:  
• understand response time performance—which included the assessment of the 
relevance of targets and the reliability of data 
• use response time information to drive response time performance 
• report response time performance to relevant stakeholders so they can 
understand agency performance. 
Audit summary 
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A previous VAGO audit, Emergency Response Times: ICT Systems, examined the 
procedures and the information and communications technology systems used by the 
Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority (ESTA) to answer 000 calls and 
dispatch emergency response vehicles. In this audit we have focused on activity from 
the point of dispatch until arrival on the scene, and have not audited the performance 
of ESTA. 
We have limited our examination of response time performance to Code 1 or Priority 1 
responses, including Priority 0 for AV, and have referred to these as 'emergency 
responses' or 'responses' throughout this report. We examined agency response data 
from 1 January 2012 through to 30 June 2014. 
Conclusion 
The performance frameworks that ESOs use to monitor emergency response times do 
not allow Parliament and the public to hold agencies fully to account. There are 
multiple problems with the design of the measures and methods for calculating results 
and therefore the reported results fail to appropriately describe performance. This may 
distort the public and Parliament's understanding of how effectively these services are 
being delivered, and may affect the subsequent decisions government and ESOs 
make. 
The current emergency response time targets are outdated or not based on evidence. 
This means that the arrival of an emergency service within, for example, 7.7 minutes 
for MFESB or 15 minutes for AV, does not necessarily reflect better practice, optimal 
service efficiency or improved outcomes.  
Response time reporting does not appropriately represent the extent of emergency 
response activity. Some agencies exclude significant numbers of emergency 
responses, while others include lesser priority responses.  
Reported response time performance fairly represents actual performance in most 
instances, but a number of control weaknesses and calculation inconsistencies have 
created minor inaccuracies and the risk of greater errors.  
External reports do not have enough information to allow readers to understand 
response time performance. With the exception of MFESB's annual report, response 
time reports do not include: 
• the actual time that agencies take to respond to most emergencies 
• reports of performance at the regional level 
• performance trends. 
Ninety per cent of statewide emergencies are responded to by the five ESOs within a 
range of 7.8 minutes—for urban structure fire responses—to 27.0 minutes—for 
statewide road accident rescues. Our assessment of ESOs response times shows they 
have been relatively stable since January 2012. 
Audit summary 
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The agencies that measure response times communicate this performance internally 
and can demonstrate the ways they have used this to drive improvement. However, 
agencies could strengthen their monitoring by also reviewing and acting on trends in 
response time performance over time.  
Improving emergency response time measures is important as timely response is a 
relevant and crucial component of emergency service delivery. Victoria Police should 
improve its internal performance measurement by monitoring and analysing 
organisation-wide emergency response times.  
Response times alone do not adequately describe emergency service performance 
and must be considered alongside information on outcomes, service quality, efficiency 
and cost effectiveness for emergency service performance to be understood. 
Findings 
Measuring response times 
Response times are a relevant component of performance measurement frameworks 
for emergency service delivery. However, they are not appropriate stand-alone 
measures for overall emergency service performance. They do not measure the 
outcomes, quality, quantity or cost of emergency service delivery and do not cover 
other key emergency services such as prevention, investigation and education.  
All audited ESOs except Victoria Police monitor and report on emergency response 
time measures. However, their targets for minutes to respond lack an up-to-date 
evidence base or clear rationale: 
• agencies could not provide evidence or explain the rationale underpinning targets 
for ambulance, road accident rescue and emergency medical response  
• targets for responses to structure fires were based on outdated scientific 
research and work MFESB undertook in 1987.  
Without valid time targets current emergency response time measures fail to describe 
performance in any meaningful way. 
Response time reporting does not provide a comprehensive picture of emergency 
services responses. Due to narrow definitions, DJR Budget Paper 3 (BP3) measures 
exclude 83 per cent of Code 1 emergency responses by CFA, MFESB and SES. 
Conversely, AV emergency response time measures include the majority of its 
responses to 000 calls, indicating many lesser priority responses are captured in 
reporting. 
AV, MFESB and SES cannot be held fully accountable for their response time 
performance as reported by their current measures, as these include call-processing 
and dispatch activity not entirely within their control. This is in conflict with the 
Department of Treasury and Finance’s Budget and Financial Management Guidance 
(BFMG) which require performance measures to be 'directly attributable to the actions 
of the organisation'.  
Audit summary 
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DHHS and DJR have reviewed response time measures each year as part of the 
Budget Paper process and when setting funding agreements with ESOs. However, 
these reviews have not fulfilled the BFMG requirements to consider the ongoing 
relevance of the measures and targets. DHHS has also failed to review targets in light 
of consistent underperformance. 
Accurate and reliable response time information  
We found a number of weaknesses in the accuracy and reliability of reported 
emergency response time performance. 
Despite more accurate data being available from ESTA's Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD) system since 2011, DHHS and AV used data for rural ambulance responses 
generated from a less reliable system. ESTA's CAD data shows rural ambulance 
response times that are, on average, approximately one minute slower than the times 
reported by DHHS and AV. This translates to a difference of close to 2 per cent in 
reported statewide performance. In December 2014, AV advised it plans to shift to 
using the ESTA CAD data in 2015 and to publicly release CAD-based rural response 
data quarterly. 
AV has adequate overall controls over the accuracy of response time performance 
data, and is the only agency undertaking routine data audits. While MFESB's data for 
structure fires and emergency medical responses is sound, we found minor errors in 
road accident rescue reporting due to gaps in data controls. We found minor errors 
and inconsistencies in DJR, SES and CFA annual reports and Budget Papers—also 
due to weaknesses in data controls.  
DJR has not provided sufficient guidance to agencies on calculation methods for BP3 
reporting. As a result MFESB, CFA and SES are applying different counting methods 
for the same kinds of emergencies. Applying consistent methods for the shared 
measures would alter the performance results reported in BP3. 
The Victoria Police response time data held in ESTA systems is not yet sufficiently 
reliable to use for external performance reporting as there are limited controls over the 
data input by police officers, and around a quarter of police responses are not currently 
recorded. However, this data could still be useful for internal performance 
management. 
DJR and DHHS have not met BFMG requirements to ensure that the data 
underpinning their BP3 output performance measures is auditable and verified for 
accuracy. Both DJR and DHHS rely on ESOs to ensure data accuracy without 
checking agency data controls or undertaking their own audits. 
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Some audited agencies had already acknowledged the need to strengthen controls for 
response time data, prior to the audit commencing. DHHS and AV plan to strengthen 
data verification by introducing the Victorian Ambulance Data Set project in 2015. CFA 
commissioned a data quality review in 2014 and has accepted recommendations to 
strengthen data quality. SES has a project to introduce automated response time 
recording. Emergency Management Victoria, on behalf of DJR, is in the early stages of 
initiatives to improve the consistency of response time performance information. 
Implementing these initiatives will help strengthen the accuracy and reliability of 
reported response time performance.  
Response time performance 
Our analysis of response times shows that for each of the ESOs, the time taken for 
them to respond to 90 per cent of Code 1 or Priority 1 cases in 2013–14 was: 
• AV statewide—22.4 minutes (including Priority 0) 
• MFESB metropolitan Melbourne structure fire responses—7.8 minutes 
• MFESB metropolitan Melbourne emergency medical responses—8.3 minutes 
• MFESB metropolitan Melbourne road accident rescue responses—14.5 minutes 
• CFA statewide structure fire responses—11.2 minutes 
• CFA statewide road accident rescue responses—28.7 minutes 
• SES statewide road accident rescue responses—31.0 minutes 
• Victoria Police statewide Priority 1 cases—20.6 minutes. 
We have calculated these times consistent with how the agencies treat call-processing 
time that involves ESTA. This means some of the times include call-processing time, 
and others do not. 
For all ESOs, these performance levels have been relatively stable since 
January 2012.  
Noting the lack of evidence supporting all emergency response time performance 
targets, all services except AV are performing at or close to targets. AV has 
consistently not met targets since the organisation was created in 2008.  
Response time performance varies significantly at the regional level. This is not 
publicly reported, with the exception of information released by AV in December 2014. 
For example, the Hume region has the longest Code 1 ambulance response times in 
the state and in 2013–14 the MFESB's Western District of Melbourne consistently 
underperformed in comparison to other districts for MFESB Code 1 responses. 
With the exception of Victoria Police, ESOs share response time performance 
information broadly with staff and volunteers. However, there are still opportunities for 
MFESB, CFA and SES to improve reporting to senior management by including trends 
and analysis of the factors driving underperformance. 
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With the exception of MFESB and until very recently AV, external reports of response 
time performance lack critical information such as times, trends, regional variation and 
analysis of the factors driving performance. This additional information would allow 
Parliament and the public to better assess emergency service performance, and help 
service users understand how long responses in their area are likely to take, and 
whether performance is improving or declining. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
1. That the Department of Health & Human Services and the 
Department of Justice & Regulation, in consultation with their 
portfolio emergency service agencies that have response time 
measures, determine relevant targets for these. 
22 
2. That the Department of Justice & Regulation broadens Budget 
Paper 3 response time measures to more comprehensively 
cover emergency responses to fires, rescues and other 
emergencies. 
22 
3. That the Department of Health & Human Services and 
Ambulance Victoria focus emergency response time reporting 
on highest priority cases.  
22 
4. That the Department of Health & Human Services' and the 
Department of Justice & Regulation's public reporting of 
response time measures clearly attribute accountability for each 
phase of emergency response, including call-taking time 
involving the Emergency Services Telecommunications 
Authority. 
22 
5. That the Department of Health & Human Services uses 
Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Computer 
Aided Dispatch data to report ambulance emergency response 
time performance.  
32 
6. That the Department of Health & Human Services and 
Department of Justice & Regulation verify that response time 
data used in their reports on output performance measures is 
accurate and auditable. 
32 
7. That the Department of Justice & Regulation applies a 
consistent approach to emergency response time measures 
including data capture, calculation and reporting. 
32 
8. That the Country Fire Authority, Victoria State Emergency 
Service and Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
improve controls over response time data collection and 
reporting. 
32 
9. That Victoria Police assesses and where practical addresses 
limitations to available data and trials the use of response times 
for internal performance measurement. 
32 
10. That Ambulance Victoria, Country Fire Authority, Metropolitan 
Fire and Emergency Services Board and Victoria State 
Emergency Service improve the transparency of public 
reporting on response times by including regional performance, 
times, trends and analysis of the factors affecting performance. 
47 
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Submissions and comments received 
We have professionally engaged with the Department of Health & Human Services, 
the Department of Justice & Regulation, Ambulance Victoria, the Metropolitan Fire 
and Emergency Services Board, the Country Fire Authority, the Victoria State 
Emergency Service, Victoria Police and the Emergency Services Telecommunications 
Authority throughout the course of the audit. In accordance with section 16(3) of the 
Audit Act 1994 we provided a copy of this report to those agencies and requested their 
submissions or comments. 
We have considered those views in reaching our audit conclusions and have 
represented them to the extent relevant and warranted. Their full section 16(3) 
submissions and comments are included in Appendix B. 
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1  Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Emergency service organisations (ESO) respond to unplanned incidents that can 
threaten both property and public health and safety. Such incidents include fires, 
medical emergencies, road accidents and crime. These incidents range in severity 
from false alarms to major statewide emergencies such as bushfires or storms.  
The majority of these emergency responses are triggered by calls from members of 
the public to Triple Zero. The Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority 
(ESTA) handles calls for emergency assistance and dispatches the appropriate ESO. 
The speed of an ESO response to an emergency incident can have a significant effect 
on the outcome. A delayed response can have life-changing health, welfare and 
economic consequences. Citizens expect a prompt response to an emergency call and 
want to know how long the response is likely to take. Therefore, the public takes a 
strong interest in the responsiveness of Victoria's emergency services.  
Emergency response time information is valuable for identifying potential areas for 
improvement, informing agencies and government about performance to guide 
decisions, and providing the public with confidence in ESOs. The relevance and 
reliability of the performance measures, underpinning data and reporting systems is 
therefore critical.  
Photograph courtesy of the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board. 
Background 
 
2       Emergency Service Response Times Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
1.2 Emergency responses 
In 2013–14, the following ESOs—Victoria Police, Ambulance Victoria (AV), the Country 
Fire Authority (CFA), the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFESB) 
and the Victoria State Emergency Service (SES)—responded to a total of 1 765 638 
incidents. This included 469 297 Code 1 or Priority 1 cases, which represent the 
highest priority emergencies. Figure 1A shows the number of incidents by agency.  
  Figure 1A
Incidents responded to by ESOs in 2013–14 
Agency  
Code 1 and 
Priority 1 incidents  Other incidents Total incidents 
Victoria Police 84 792 726 827 811 619 
AV(a)  321 839 522 222 844 061 
CFA 29 661 12 256 41 917 
MFESB 31 885 4 786 36 671 
SES 1 120 30 250 31 370 
Total 469 297 1 296 341 1 765 638 
(a) The figures for AV only include road responses and exclude incidents responded to by air 
ambulance. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office.  
Code 1 or Priority 1 incidents are typically the highest priority cases responded to by 
ESOs, however, each ESO defines these differently. For example, CFA Code 1 
incidents relate to an immediate threat to life or property, whereas AV classifies an 
incident as Code 1 where it is 'time critical' requiring a 'lights and sirens response'. 
Appendix A includes the definitions of Code 1 and Priority 1 used by each ESO. 
1.3 Roles and responsibilities 
Figure 1B outlines a range of government departments, agencies and ESOs that 
contribute to Victoria's emergency response capabilities, reporting and accountability 
framework. On 1 January 2015, a number of machinery of government changes came 
into effect, and consequently the Department of Justice (DOJ) became the Department 
of Justice & Regulation (DJR) and the Department of Health (DH) became the 
Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS). The responsibilities of the former 
departments transferred to the new entities. 
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  Figure 1B
Agency roles and responsibilities 
Agency Roles and responsibilities 
Department of Justice 
& Regulation 
Overarching responsibility for delivering and monitoring the 
emergency responses of agencies within the justice portfolio. 
This includes MFESB, CFA, SES and Victoria Police. Emergency 
Management Victoria, both on behalf of DJR and under its own 
legislation, delivers the majority of these oversight 
responsibilities.  
Emergency 
Management Victoria 
A statutory body established on 1 July 2014 responsible for 
setting and maintaining performance standards and coordinating 
data collection for the emergency response times of CFA, 
MFESB and SES for inclusion in justice portfolio Budget Papers. 
Department of Health 
& Human Services 
Overarching responsibility for delivering and monitoring the 
emergency responses of the health portfolio, including 
ambulance services. The Secretary also has specific 
responsibilities under s.9 of the Ambulance Services Act 1986 to 
'monitor, evaluate and review ambulance services' and 'in 
consultation with ambulance services, to develop criteria or 
measures that enable comparisons to be made between the 
performance of ambulance services'.  
Ambulance Victoria Responsible for responding to medical emergencies and 
transporting patients to medical facilities by road and air. AV also 
transports people to medical facilities in non-emergency 
situations, and refers emergency calls to other services where 
appropriate. 
Country Fire Authority 
 
Responsible for preventing and suppressing fires on private land 
outside the Metropolitan District and some metropolitan areas 
such as Frankston and Dandenong. CFA has both volunteer and 
career firefighters, and along with SES is also responsible for 
road accident rescue operations outside the Metropolitan District. 
Metropolitan Fire and 
Emergency Services 
Board 
 
Responsible for providing firefighting, rescue, road accident 
rescue, marine response and hazardous material responses 
within the Metropolitan District. In addition, MFESB units act as 
emergency medical responders for urgent cases in the 
Metropolitan District, providing resuscitation and life support until 
AV paramedics arrive. 
Victoria State 
Emergency Service 
 
SES is the control agency for natural disasters and also responds 
to rescue incidents in conjunction with CFA and MFESB. All 
rescues are performed by the agency’s volunteers. It also 
provides regular support to CFA, MFESB, AV and Victoria Police 
for search and rescue on land and inland waterways. 
Victoria Police 
 
Responds to calls for assistance, preventing, detecting and 
investigating offences and supporting the judicial process.  
Emergency Services 
Telecommunications 
Authority 
Receives all 000 emergency calls and dispatches the appropriate 
services to emergencies.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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1.4 Response time measures 
1.4.1 Responsibility for setting response time measures 
Departments work with ESOs to set, review and report on response time measures. 
In line with Budget and Financial Management Guidance issued by the Department of 
Treasury and Finance, it is the responsibility of DHHS and DJR to recommend their 
output performance measures and targets to government, to verify the accuracy of 
reported performance and to review the measures and targets annually for relevance 
and robustness.  
ESOs contribute to DHHS and DJR's outputs. Different ESOs may have different 
targets for their contribution to the same output performance measure. ESOs agree to 
their contribution to output performance measures as conditions of their annual funding 
arrangements and may advise departments of any changes necessary to the 
measures. Departments and ESOs monitor ESO performance against their component 
of output performance measures. ESOs are required to publish their performance 
against these output performance measures in their annual reports and may publish 
additional performance information at their discretion.  
1.4.2 Reporting on response time measures 
Recognising the importance of timely responses to emergency incidents, the 
government monitors response times through output performance measures reported 
to Parliament in the Budget Papers.  
Output performance measures currently capture: 
• ambulance responses  
• emergency medical responses—provided by MFESB in support of ambulance 
responses for cardiac arrests and non-breathing patients 
• structure fire responses—inside a building or the structure of a building 
• road accident rescue responses—freeing people trapped in motor vehicles. 
DHHS reports on the performance of AV in ambulance response. 
DJR reports the aggregated performance of CFA, MFESB and SES for emergency 
medical, structure fire and road accident rescue responses. DJR does not measure or 
report response time performance for Victoria Police. 
The four ESOs who measure their response times also report their individual 
performance against output measures in their annual reports. 
Figure 1C shows the relevant output performance measures and targets for each 
portfolio and agency.  
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  Figure 1C
Response time output performance measures and targets 
Output performance measures by 
agency/department 
Target/benchmarks 
Minutes Percentage 
DJR output performance measures   
Emergency medical response times meeting 
benchmarks (minutes)—applies to MFESB 
As per agency 
targets below 
90 
Structure fire response times meeting benchmarks 
(minutes)—applies to CFA and MFESB 
As per agency 
targets below 
90 
Road accident rescue response times meeting 
benchmarks (minutes)—applies to SES, CFA and 
MFESB 
As per agency 
targets below 
90 
CFA component of DJR measures   
Structure fire response—medium urban (hazard 
classification 2 only—significant urban areas, involving 
commercial centres, clusters of industrial and/or 
institutional hazards) 
8 90 
Road accident rescue response—urban zone (the 
Melbourne Statistical Division plus the municipal districts 
of Greater Geelong, Greater Bendigo, Ballarat, Latrobe, 
Greater Shepparton) 
20 90 
Road accident rescue response—rural zone (rest of 
Victoria) 
40 90 
MFESB component of DJR measures   
Emergency medical response 9.2 90 
Structure fire response 7.7 90 
Road accident rescue response—urban zone 
(Metropolitan District) 
13.5 90 
SES component of DJR measures   
Road accident rescue response—urban zone (the 
Melbourne Statistical Division plus the municipal districts 
of Greater Geelong, Greater Bendigo, Ballarat, Latrobe, 
Greater Shepparton) 
24 90 
Road accident rescue response—rural zone (rest of 
Victoria) 
44 90 
Victoria Police   
Does not measure response times   
DHHS BP3 measures (includes AV only)   
Proportion of emergency (Code 1) incidents responded 
to within 15 minutes—statewide 
15 85 
Proportion of emergency (Code 1) incidents responded 
to within 15 minutes—centres with a population of more 
than 7 500 
15 90 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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1.5 Previous relevant audits 
There are three previous VAGO reports related to this audit. 
1.5.1 Emergency Response ICT Systems 
The October 2014 report, Emergency Response ICT Systems, found that ESTA is 
meeting its call-taking performance standards and its non-emergency dispatch 
standards. It is also meeting its required emergency dispatch standards for police and 
fire services, but has consistently failed to meet its ambulance emergency dispatch 
standards for the past three years. 
1.5.2 Public Sector Performance Measurement and 
Reporting 
The October 2014 report, Public Sector Performance Measurement and Reporting, 
found that the three sampled departments, including DHHS, were not effectively 
applying the government's performance measurement and reporting system. The audit 
found that the absence of meaningful commentary in annual reports and Budget 
Papers meant that output performance measures were impenetrable to the reader.  
1.5.3 Access to Ambulance Services 
The October 2010 report, Access to Ambulance Services, found that ambulances were 
taking longer to respond to Code 1 emergencies and had yet to meet targets set in 
2008. Response times had worsened more in rural regions than in the metropolitan 
area, and varied significantly. The audit recommended that AV publish information on 
geographical variations in performance, so the public could better understand the 
expected ambulance response times in their district. The audit also recommended that 
AV publish measures of response times at the 50th and 90th percentiles, and that 
DHHS report on performance for total case time, broken down by the elements 
attributable to ESTA, AV and hospitals.  
 
Photograph courtesy of Ambulance Victoria. 
Background 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  Emergency Service Response Times        7 
1.6 Audit objective and scope 
The audit objective was to determine the extent to which agencies are accountable for 
emergency response time performance. To assess this objective, the audit examined 
whether agencies: 
• understand response time performance 
• use response time information to drive response time performance 
• report response time performance to relevant stakeholders. 
We determined whether agencies understand response time performance by 
assessing whether: 
• response time measures are relevant, appropriate and fairly represent 
performance 
• response time performance meets or exceeds expected performance 
• agencies assess and monitor response time trends. 
We determined whether agencies use response time information to drive response 
time performance by assessing whether: 
• action is taken to address significant variation 
• actions are monitored for effectiveness in improving response time and revised 
as needed. 
We determined whether agencies report response time performance to relevant 
stakeholders by assessing whether: 
• agencies report response time performance to relevant internal business units 
and senior management 
• agencies inform the public about response time expectations and performance 
• agencies inform the government of response time performance. 
The audit examined DJR, DHHS, AV, Victoria Police, CFA, MFESB and SES.  
We limited our examination of response time performance to Code 1 or Priority 1 
responses—including Priority 0 for AV—and refer to these as 'emergency responses' 
or 'responses' throughout the report.  
We tested response time data from 1 January 2012 through to 30 June 2014. 
As ESTA's response time performance was the subject of a recent audit, it was not 
included in the scope of this audit. However, data collected by ESTA was analysed and 
compared against ESOs' data. 
  
Background 
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1.7 Audit method and cost 
Methods for this audit included:  
• examination of documents and interviews with staff at the audited agencies 
• site visits to speak to frontline emergency response personnel 
• observation of data capture and reporting systems 
• examination of controls over data quality, such as guidance for staff, information 
technology systems and processes for checking accuracy 
• analysis of response time data 
• testing of response time data for accuracy  
• review of publically available research and official documents.  
We did not benchmark with other jurisdictions because of difficulties in comparing 
measures and data. The audit was performed in accordance with the Australian 
Auditing and Assurance Standards. Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, 
unless otherwise indicated any persons named in this report are not the subject of 
adverse comment or opinion. 
The cost of the audit was $485 000. 
1.8 Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
• Part 2 examines the relevance and appropriateness of emergency service 
response time measures 
• Part 3 examines the accuracy and reliability of emergency response time 
information 
• Part 4 examines emergency response time performance. 
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2  Relevant measures and targets 
At a glance 
Background  
Meaningful and comprehensive measures and targets are essential to understanding 
emergency response time performance. We assessed whether response time 
measures are relevant, appropriately cover activity and have targets based on evidence 
or a clear rationale. 
Conclusion 
Accountability for emergency response times is undermined by performance measures 
that do not cover the full range of emergencies and have targets that are outdated or 
not based on evidence. The departments of Health & Human Services (DHHS) and 
Justice & Regulation (DJR) have not appropriately reviewed measures to identify and 
address these issues.   
Findings  
• Response times are relevant measures of emergency service delivery when part 
of a broader set of performance measures. 
• Agencies could not explain the basis for targets for ambulance, road accident 
rescue and emergency medical responses. Structure fire response time targets 
are based on outdated evidence. 
• DJR response time measures excluded 83 per cent of 2013–14 emergency 
responses by the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFESB), the 
Country Fire Authority (CFA) and the Victoria State Emergency Service (SES).  
• Ambulance Victoria's (AV) response time measures no longer focus on the most 
urgent cases. 
• Some measures include call-processing activity not entirely within agency control. 
• DHHS and DJR annual reviews of measures do not consider ongoing relevance. 
Recommendations 
• That DHHS and DJR, in consultation with AV, CFA, MFESB and SES determine 
relevant targets for current response time measures. 
• That DJR broadens response time measures to include a more comprehensive 
reflection of emergency responses to fires, rescues and other emergencies. 
• That DHHS and AV focus response time reporting on highest priority cases. 
• That DHHS' and DJR's public reporting attribute accountability for each phase of 
response, including call-taking time involving ESTA. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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2.1 Introduction 
Accountability for performance is a cornerstone of public sector management. 
Reporting performance against predetermined measures and targets sets clear 
expectations and is the principal mechanism by which agencies and departments are 
held to account. 
The critical nature of emergency services to the community also means that the public 
has a keen interest in understanding how emergency service organisations (ESO) are 
performing. To achieve this, agencies must design meaningful performance measures 
that are relevant to their objectives and appropriately cover their key activities. 
Meaningful performance measures are difficult to design. Agencies must decide: 
• what activity the measure should include and exclude 
• whether to measure the outcomes, quantity, quality, timeliness or cost of an 
activity 
• the target to set for the measure. 
The Victorian Government provides guidance to departments on how to create 
performance measures, for use in Budget Papers and annual reports, through its 
Budget and Financial Management Guidance (BFMG). The BFMG sets criteria for 
good quality performance measures. 
Drawing on BFMG criteria, this audit has assessed whether emergency service 
response time measures and targets are: 
• relevant to agency and departmental objectives 
• based on evidence 
• covering key aspects of performance 
• directly attributable to the actions of the agencies 
• annually reviewed 
• reassessed where there is constant significant under or over performance 
• verified for accuracy—addressed in Part 3. 
2.2 Conclusion 
All the audited ESOs except Victoria Police monitor and report on emergency 
response times. However, current performance measures undermine agency 
accountability for emergency response time performance.  
Response times are a relevant component of performance measurement frameworks 
for emergency service delivery. However, they are not appropriate stand-alone 
measures for overall emergency service performance. Response time performance 
must be presented and understood in the context of outcome performance measures. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Emergency response time targets are outdated or not based on evidence. This means 
that the arrival of an emergency service within, for example, 7.7 minutes for 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFESB) or 15 minutes for 
Ambulance Victoria (AV), does not necessarily reflect better practice, optimal service 
efficiency or improved outcomes.  
Response time reporting does not appropriately represent the extent of emergency 
response activity. In 2013–14, the Department of Justice & Regulation's (DJR) Budget 
Paper 3 (BP3) measures excluded 83 per cent of Priority 1 emergency responses by 
the Country Fire Authority (CFA), MFESB and the Victoria State Emergency Service 
(SES) due to narrow definitions. Conversely, AV response time measures included 
58 per cent of all ambulance emergency responses, indicating many lesser priority 
responses were captured in reporting. 
Current performance measures hold AV, SES and MFESB to account for response 
time performance that is not entirely within their control, as they include call-processing 
and dispatch activity managed by the Emergency Services Telecommunications 
Authority (ESTA). This contravenes the BFMG requirement that performance 
measures should be 'directly attributable to the actions of the organisation'.  
Although the Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) and DJR review 
response time measures each year as part of the Budget Paper process, these 
reviews have not considered the ongoing relevance of the measures and targets and 
have therefore failed to address these issues.  
Response times alone do not adequately describe emergency service performance 
and must be considered alongside information on outcomes, service quality, efficiency 
and cost effectiveness for emergency service performance to be understood. 
2.3 Relevant and evidence-based measures  
2.3.1 Relevance to agency and departmental objectives 
The overall performance of emergency services cannot be understood through 
response times alone. They do not provide insight into outcomes or quality, nor do they 
convey information about the effectiveness of other core emergency service functions 
such as prevention, mitigation, investigation and education. 
Response times are, however, a relevant component of performance measurement 
frameworks for emergency service delivery. Response time measures align, to varying 
extents, with agency and departmental objectives and offer an assessment of the 
timeliness of key services ESOs provide.  
Relevant measures and targets 
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Ambulance responses 
Measuring emergency response times directly relates to an Ambulance Services 
Act 1986 objective 'to respond rapidly to requests for help in a medical emergency'. It 
also is related, indirectly, to DHHS's BP3 priority of 'developing a system that is 
responsive to people's needs' and its objective to 'improve the quality, effectiveness 
and efficiency of health care services for Victorians'. 
However, there is no clear correlation in research between faster ambulance response 
times and improved patient outcomes for all but a minority of acute cases such as 
cardiac arrest. This means that response times alone cannot provide a relevant 
overarching measure of AV's performance. To better account for its performance AV 
reports against outcomes for cardiac arrest patients and reports the percentage of 
major trauma and stroke patients transported to appropriate facilities within times 
known to improve clinical outcomes. DHHS BP3 and AV annual reports state that it has 
consistently met targets for these measures. 
Emergency medical responses 
In specific metropolitan locations, ESTA dispatches MFESB at the same time as AV to 
provide medical support for patients suffering cardiac arrest or who are not breathing. 
Measuring emergency medical response (EMR) times is relevant to the MFESB 
mission to protect life. MFESB attends more EMR cases than structure fires. 
Structure fire responses  
Minimising the time taken to respond to fires is a key component of effectively 
suppressing structure fires. Therefore, a response time measure is relevant to MFESB 
and CFA missions to protect life, property and the environment and to DJR's BP3 
objectives of minimising injury and property loss and enhancing safety. The 
Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958 also requires MFESB to 'proceed with all practical 
speed to the scene of the alarm of the fire'. 
However, CFA and MFESB meet their objective to protect lives in more ways than just 
a quick response. Some fires can escalate to a deadly stage quicker than a fire service 
can attend. As a result, fire services are placing increasing emphasis on prevention 
strategies—such as building modifications, sprinklers, extinguishers and community 
education—to prevent fatalities. To account for their performance of these prevention 
functions, CFA and MFESB report a range of other measures, including containment of 
fires to room of origin and fatalities. 
Road accident rescue responses 
SES, MFESB and CFA conduct road accident rescues. Response times for road 
accident rescue are directly relevant to the SES purpose outlined in its strategic plan to 
provide ‘timely and effective emergency services’. A timely response to road accident 
rescues can help prevent fatalities and further accidents. Road accident rescue 
response times are therefore relevant to CFA and MFESB missions to protect life, and 
have a logical relationship to DJR's BP3 objectives of minimising injury and property 
loss, and enhancing safety. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Police responses 
Victoria Police does not currently measure response times. Measuring response times 
to urgent calls for assistance would not be directly relevant to Victoria Police statutory 
objectives to protect life and property, as police require time to plan a safe and 
appropriate response and achieve the best possible outcome. Failure to apply 
appropriate safety principles, including taking time to plan before responding, was cited 
by the Office of Police Integrity as a key factor underpinning six fatal shootings 
between 2003 and 2006. For this reason, measuring response times is also not directly 
relevant to DJR’s BP3 objective for Policing Services, ‘Improving community safety 
through policing, law enforcement and prevention activities’.  
Our review of complaints about police responses and incident debriefs did not find any 
systemic issues with the timeliness of police responses to urgent calls. Nonetheless, 
response times would be relevant to monitoring the achievement of internal agency 
goals, specifically the Victoria Police 2013–14 to 2015–16 corporate plan outcome of 
providing 'responses to calls for assistance in a timely manner'.  
2.3.2 Evidence base for targets 
Response time measures include target times for agencies to attend emergencies. We 
expected agencies' response time targets to have been informed by either: 
• available research 
• applicable national or international standards 
• historical performance trends 
• assessment of resource capacity and expected demand or 
• a combination of the above. 
None of the response time targets we audited are based on up-to-date evidence or 
have a clear rationale. Neither DHHS or DJR, nor any of the ESOs, could explain how 
they had developed time targets for ambulance responses, road accident rescue 
responses or EMRs. Although the fire services initially used a sound rationale to 
develop the targets for structure fire responses, this work is now outdated as it used 
scientific research and standards that were in place in the United Kingdom 30 years 
ago. 
Reporting the percentage of cases that meet a time indicator lacking evidence or 
rationale fails to describe agency performance in any meaningful way.  
Ambulance responses 
DHHS set targets for AV of 85 per cent (statewide) and 90 per cent (for centres with a 
population over 7 500) of Code 1 incidents to be responded to in 15 minutes.  
The 15-minute ambulance response time target is not supported by clinical or 
operational evidence or a clear rationale.  
Relevant measures and targets 
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The targets evolved from work undertaken in 2003 by a consultative committee for 
government, and are based on performance of the previous Metropolitan Ambulance 
Service and not the current statewide service. The 2003 report found that there were 
no international benchmarks for ambulance response time targets and did not provide 
an evidence base for the 15-minute target adopted.  
Emergency medical responses 
MFESB and DJR were unable to provide a rationale for the target of 90 per cent of 
EMRs to be attended within 9.2 minutes. 
Structure fire responses  
Budget Papers report response times for structure fires against two targets—
7.7 minutes for MFESB and 8 minutes for CFA responses. CFA's target is based on 
MFESB's 7.7 minute target, rounded up to accommodate limitations in their data 
capture system at the time.  
MFESB is the only ESO to have used a sound evidence base when setting time 
targets in 1987. However, this evidence base is now outdated.   
The 7.7 minute target evolved from influential 1950's research from the United 
Kingdom that showed it took between 12 and 15 minutes for structure fires to 
‘flashover’. Flashover is when heat from a fire climbs to a point that surfaces in a 
confined space suddenly ignite, with rapid escalation of risk to property and life. In 
1987, MFESB applied flashover research to its own data on response times and fire 
outcomes in Melbourne, finding that 90 per cent of cases where fires had been 
contained and flashover had been prevented had been responded to in under 
7.8 minutes—approximately 10 minutes including call-processing time. MFESB 
therefore set a 7.7 minute target, as it was within the benchmark range suggested by 
United Kingdom research, and provided equitable outcomes across the majority of its 
territory. 
This was a sound process as it balanced consideration of international research, 
analysis of local performance and Victorian Government service delivery expectations. 
However, MFESB has not revisited this process since 1987. MFESB reviewed this 
measure in 2009 but did not consider the currency of the evidence base for the target. 
Key assumptions underpinning the 7.7 minute target may no longer be valid. For 
example: 
• a 1994 Victorian Parliamentary inquiry found that flashover time had shortened 
and was likely to occur between 5 and 10 minutes 
• a 2006 Emergency Services Commissioner review found that flashover times 
alone are no longer a robust basis for a response time target, as modern 
buildings can flashover too quickly for firefighters to suppress the fire, due to the 
increased presence of plastics in buildings. 
The 7.7 minute target may no longer be relevant to MFESB and CFA structure fire 
responses and should be updated. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Road accident rescue responses 
The response time targets introduced to BP3 in 2012–13 were based on the latest 
version of the State Road Rescue Arrangements (the Arrangements) produced by the 
Emergency Services Commissioner, on the advice of a working party made up of all 
five ESOs, and released in 2010. The Arrangements set response standards for road 
accident rescues as follows: 
• call processing—4 minutes 
• turnout time (the time between when an agency is notified of an incident until 
when the responder begins travelling to the incident)—8 minutes for volunteers, 
1.5 minutes for paid on-station crews 
• travel time—12 minutes for urban areas and 32 minutes for rural areas. 
MFESB, CFA and SES then used these time standards to develop their respective 
targets. However, none of the agencies could provide any evidence or rationale to 
support the time standards set out in the Arrangements that underpin their response 
time targets. 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Country Fire Authority. 
Police responses 
Victoria Police does not have targets for response times. Although some other 
Australian jurisdictions have set targets for police response times, there are no national 
or international benchmarks.  
Relevant measures and targets 
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2.3.3 Comprehensive coverage of key activity 
BFMG requires that performance measures cover key aspects of performance. 
However, current response time output performance measures do not appropriately 
represent the range of emergency responses—excluding significant numbers of 
emergency responses for some agencies and including lesser priority responses for 
others.  
Emergencies excluded from response time reporting 
External reports on response time performance do not include the majority of 
emergency responses. These significant exclusions, however, do not mask poor 
performance. We tested samples of excluded incidents and found that response times 
were either improved or stayed the same if they were included. Figure 2A shows the 
proportion of each ESO's emergency responses that were reported by DJR and 
DHHS.  
  Figure 2A
Proportion of emergency response incidents included in response time 
output performance measures, 2013–14 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from data provided by agencies. 
Although DHHS reported almost all of AV's Priority 1 responses, DJR's BP3 reporting 
for 2013–14 only included 17 per cent of the Code 1 and Priority 1 responses by SES, 
CFA and MFESB. This is because DJR chooses to measure and report only on 
selected categories of Code 1 and Priority 1 emergencies—structure fires, road 
accident rescues and EMRs. This excludes a wide range of other Code 1 and Priority 1 
emergencies responded to by CFA, MFESB and SES, such as: 
• fires in cars and other vehicles 
• spills of hazardous materials 
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• rescues of people trapped in collapsed buildings, under fallen trees or in 
floodwater 
• fires in parks and on nature strips 
• fires that later turn out to be false alarms. 
  Figure 2B
Incidents included in BP3 reporting by incident category, 2013–14 
 
Note: SES includes some non-Priority 0 or 1 road accident rescue incidents in its reporting. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from data provided by agencies.  
DJR also applies further significant exclusions within those types of emergencies it 
selects for reporting. Figure 2B shows that while performance reports comprehensively 
capture ambulance and EMR response times, a significant proportion of responses to 
road accident rescues and CFA structure fires are excluded. 
Structure fire responses  
DJR's BP3 reports on response time performance do not fully reflect the extent of 
emergency responses to structure fires—excluding 23 per cent of responses to 
structure fires in 2013–14. Although DJR included 99 per cent of MFESB responses, it 
only included 53 per cent of CFA responses due to narrow definitions. 
CFA responds to fires across a range of urban and rural locations. CFA classifies fires 
by the density and type of structures on the land, and by location. Figure 2C explains 
these hazard classifications. DJR only includes CFA responses to structure fire 
incidents in Hazard Classification 2.  
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  Figure 2C
CFA's hazard classifications 
Hazard classification Definition 
Classification 1—
High urban 
Discontinued in 1998. Prior to that Corio Petroleum Refinery 
was the only CFA recognised Classification 1 hazard in the 
state. 
Classification 2—
Medium urban 
Significant urban areas, primarily residential areas involving 
commercial centres, clusters of industrial and/or institutional 
hazards. 
Classification 3—
Low urban 
Encompasses all structural hazards in urban areas not falling 
into Classifications 1 and 2, and includes predominantly 
residential occupancies and small industries. 
Classification 4— 
Rural 
Primarily involves natural surroundings in terms of fuel, but 
also involves isolated dwellings and structures within those 
areas. 
Classification 5—
Remote rural 
Structural and rural hazards similar to Classification 4, and for 
which the location of the hazard is geographically distant from 
a fire station. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from CFA documentation. 
In contrast, CFA internal response time monitoring and reporting comprehensively 
covers all hazard classifications. 
We checked to see if including CFA Hazard Classifications 3 and 4 responses in BP3 
reporting would alter results and for 2013–14, and found it did not materially alter 
performance. 
Road accident rescue responses 
Significant numbers of road accident rescue response times are excluded from 
reporting in Budget Papers and annual reports. In 2013–14, SES excluded 35 per cent 
of the road accident rescue incidents it attended from its BP3 reporting, and CFA and 
MFESB both excluded just over 85 per cent of their rescues.  
These exclusions were mostly due to agency interpretations of definitions in the 
Arrangements. The Arrangements define road accident rescues as incidents that were 
attended by the prescribed number of competent road accident rescue personnel in an 
appropriate vehicle. As outlined in Part 3 of this report, ESOs interpret the business 
rules in the Arrangements differently, which leads to inconsistency in the kinds of 
incidents excluded by each agency. 
SES also excluded 8 per cent of responses due to members not completing incident 
reports for responses in time for the BP3 reporting deadline. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Inclusions in response time reporting 
Ambulance responses 
DHHS includes the majority of all its ambulance responses in BP3, as approximately 
60 per cent of ambulance emergency responses to 000 calls in 2013–14 were 
classified as Code 1 and very few Code 1 incidents were excluded from reporting. The 
proportion of incidents classified as Code 1 has increased over time—from 54 per cent 
in 2007–08 to 58 per cent in 2013–4. Code 1 captures a broad range of incidents and 
does not represent only those incidents that are immediately life threatening. To enable 
the public and Parliament to understand AV performance for time-critical cases, DHHS 
should refocus emergency response time reporting on the highest priority cases. 
 
Photograph courtesy of Ambulance Victoria. 
2.3.4 Directly attributable to agency actions 
BFMG requires performance measures to be directly attributable to the actions of 
agencies, however, response time measures include some activity that is outside 
agencies’ direct control. 
Factors outside the control of ESOs can affect response time performance. For 
example, our 2014 Emergency Response ICT Systems audit found that ESTA’s failure 
to meet its ambulance dispatch response time targets affected AV’s response time 
performance. Similarly, if AV does not have sufficient available ambulances, this affects 
ESTA’s ability to meet its own response time targets. 
Nonetheless, where possible, the design of output performance measures should 
minimise the extent to which another agency can influence the measured activity. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Figure 2D shows how total emergency response time includes both call processing 
and agency response time. Response times across agencies are not directly 
comparable due to different definitions of when the call-processing phase finishes, and 
their varied operating models, resource levels and areas covered. 
  Figure 2D
Time that 90 per cent of emergency cases are responded to for incidents 
included in 2013–14 BP3 measures 
 
Note: Data for road accident rescues in this chart is less reliable than other incidents due to 
smaller sample size. 
Note: More information on phases of response is available in Figure A1 in Appendix A. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from data provided by agencies and ESTA. 
Some agencies have designed their response time performance measures to exclude 
ESTA's call-processing and dispatch times, others include call-processing time: 
• ESTA response time measures cover the period from ESTA answering the call to 
its dispatch of an ESO.  
• CFA response time measures cover the period from receipt of dispatch from 
ESTA to arrival on the scene. 
• MFESB response time measures overlap slightly with the period covered by 
ESTA’s response time measures, as it includes a small amount of call-processing 
time in its structure fire and EMR time measures—on average 12–15 seconds in 
2013–14.  
• AV and SES response time measures include all of ESTA's call-processing and 
dispatch times. This can be a significant proportion of total response time.  
Therefore, AV, SES and to a lesser extent MFESB include activity in their current 
response time measures that is not directly in their control and is in conflict with BFMG 
requirements. 
0:00 5:00 10:00 15:00 20:00 25:00 30:00 35:00 40:00 45:00
MFESB—Road accident rescue response
MFESB—Emergency medical response
MFESB—Structure fire response
CFA—Road accident rescue response (urban)
CFA—Road accident rescue response (rural)
CFA—Structure fire response (hazard class 2)
SES—Road accident rescue response (urban)
SES—Road accident rescue response (rural)
AV—Statewide
AV—Metropolitan areas
Victoria police
Minutes
Call processing time Agency response time
Relevant measures and targets 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  Emergency Service Response Times        21 
It is useful for citizens to understand the total time taken for response to an emergency, 
however, when providing public reports on response time performance, departments 
and agencies should show the contribution that each agency makes to the total 
response time to clearly identify where improvements may be needed. If accountability 
for performance is shared, then public reporting should also reflect this. 
2.4 Frequency of review and reassessment 
Under BFMG, portfolio departments are responsible for reviewing measures annually 
to ensure ongoing relevance to department objectives and to reassess targets where 
there is constant significant over or underperformance. Neither DJR nor DHHS has 
fully complied with these requirements.  
Department of Justice & Regulation 
DJR reviews all BP3 measures annually but does not consider the relevance or 
evidence base of these in its review—it only considers changes to measures if there is 
over or underperformance. Reported times for structure fire responses, road accident 
rescue responses and EMRs have been close to targets, or achieved better than the 
targets, and therefore DJR has not considered any changes to the measures. This 
practice does not ensure that emergency response time measures remain relevant.  
CFA and MFESB could have recommended to DJR that it review their measures. Both 
agencies have undertaken ad hoc internal reviews of the measures and targets during 
the past five years, finding limitations and problems. However, neither agency 
recommended any changes to DJR.  
DJR reviews of output measures for Victoria Police across the past four years have not 
considered introducing response time measures, despite their use by police services in 
other Australian jurisdictions and consideration by the Productivity Commission for 
inclusion in their Report on Government Services.  
Department of Health & Human Services 
DHHS, in consultation with AV, considers response time measures each year as part of 
setting BP3 outputs and negotiating AV's funding and performance agreement with the 
Minister for Health. However, DHHS acknowledges that these reviews do not consider 
whether output performance measures, including the response time measures that 
apply to AV, fully comply with BFMG requirements.  
Over time DHHS has revised AV’s indicators, particularly to add new clinical outcome 
measures. However, DHHS has never reviewed the response time measure despite 
acknowledging the lack of supporting evidence in ministerial briefings since 2004, and 
despite AV never meeting the target. DHHS also provided advice to the Minister for 
Health in 2013 and 2014 about the lack of evidence for the AV response time target, 
but did not recommend any alternative targets or measures for consideration. 
Relevant measures and targets 
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Although they were also aware of the lack of evidence for the response time 
measures, AV had not formally recommended any changes to DHHS—it did, however 
express concern with the targets during discussions on its annual service agreement. 
Recommendations 
1. That the Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of Justice 
& Regulation, in consultation with their portfolio emergency service agencies that 
have response time measures, determine relevant targets for these. 
2. That the Department of Justice & Regulation broadens Budget Paper 3 response 
time measures to more comprehensively cover emergency responses to fires, 
rescues and other emergencies. 
3. That the Department of Health & Human Services and Ambulance Victoria focus 
emergency response time reporting on highest priority cases. 
4. That the Department of Health & Human Services' and the Department of Justice 
& Regulation's public reporting of response time measures clearly attribute 
accountability for each phase of emergency response, including call-taking time 
involving the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority. 
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3  Accurate and reliable response time information 
At a glance 
Background  
Public reports should fairly represent an agency's actual performance. We therefore 
expect agencies to use reliable and consistent data and calculation methods.  
Conclusion 
While our testing found that reported emergency response time performance fairly 
represented actual performance in most instances, weaknesses in controls within 
justice portfolio agencies, and the use of a less reliable data system for rural 
responses by Ambulance Victoria (AV) and Department of Health & Human Services 
(DHHS), created minor inaccuracies and the risk of greater errors.  
Findings  
• DHHS and AV have used less reliable rural response time data for public 
reporting that slightly improves reported statewide performance. 
• The Department of Justice & Regulation (DJR) and DHHS have not met 
requirements to ensure data is auditable and verified.  
• The Country Fire Authority (CFA), the Victoria State Emergency Service (SES) 
and the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFESB) count and 
measure road accident rescue and structure fire responses differently. 
• CFA, SES and MFESB have not undertaken routine data audits and we found 
various deficiencies in data capture and calculation. 
• Victoria Police response time data is not currently suitable for external reporting. 
Recommendations 
• That DHHS use Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Computer 
Aided Dispatch data to report ambulance emergency response times.  
• That DHHS and DJR verify the accuracy of response time data used in their 
reports on output performance measures. 
• That DJR applies a consistent approach to emergency response time measures 
including data capture, calculation and reporting. 
• That CFA, SES and MFESB improve controls over response time data collection 
and reporting. 
• That Victoria Police, where practical, addresses limitations to response time data 
and trials use in internal performance measurement. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Agency response time data is used for a range of purposes including resource 
allocation, internal performance monitoring and the measurement of agency outputs 
against government spending. Reported emergency response time information should 
therefore fairly represent actual performance.  
To ensure the accuracy and reliability of their data, agencies need to have strong 
internal controls in place. Internal controls are systems, policies and procedures for 
managing data such as:  
• reliable software 
• automated capture systems 
• clear definitions 
• periodic audits 
• appropriate access rights for users 
• processes for error checking  
• systems to ensure timely input.  
According to the Department of Treasury and Finance's (DTF) Budget and Financial 
Management Guidance (BFMG), the Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) 
and the Department of Justice & Regulation (DJR) are required to ensure that agency 
data and the methodology underpinning reports on performance measures are 
auditable and verified for accuracy. 
To determine accuracy and reliability we: 
• examined agency internal data controls 
• undertook error and completeness tests on agency data  
• attempted to reproduce the figures reported by agencies using agency data.  
While agencies report against individual emergency response time measures in their 
annual reports, some also contribute to aggregated results in Budget Paper 3 (BP3). 
For example, DJR combines results for the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services 
Board (MFESB) and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) in its BP3 reporting on 
performance in responding to structure fires. Where agency results are going to be 
combined there should be consistency in how agencies record and calculate their 
performance against the measure. We performed consistency checks by examining 
agency targets, counting rules and reporting. 
3.2 Conclusion 
Reported performance for emergency response time measures fairly represented 
actual performance in most instances. The minor errors and misreporting that we 
identified were the result of a number of control weaknesses, in particular poor 
calculation methods and lack of data auditing. These weaknesses need to be 
addressed to provide greater assurance of the accuracy of reported results, and to 
prevent the risk of more significant errors in the future.  
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Despite more reliable data being available since 2011, Ambulance Victoria (AV) and 
DHHS did not use the most accurate data for rural responses, leading to statewide 
performance likely being overstated by 1 to 2 per cent. 
Neither DHHS nor DJR have fulfilled their obligations under BFMG to ensure that the 
data and methodology underpinning reports on emergency response time measures is 
auditable and verified for accuracy. This is consistent with our 2014 Public Sector 
Performance Measurement and Reporting audit, which also found that the audited 
departments had not fulfilled this requirement. 
3.3 Accurate and reliable 
3.3.1 Department of Health & Human Services 
DHHS requires AV to attest to the accuracy and reliability of its data when submitting it 
for use in DHHS performance reports. DHHS does not undertake regular audits of AV 
data and has not reviewed AV's own auditing process. 
In 2010, DHHS commissioned a one-off audit of AV data from an external contractor. 
The audit found no material errors or inaccuracies in the samples it tested but still 
recommended improved review and monitoring processes. Although DHHS has not yet 
implemented any changes to its monitoring of AV data quality, it acknowledges this 
issue and is working with AV to strengthen data verification though the Victorian 
Ambulance Data Set project, due for implementation in 2015. 
3.3.2 Ambulance Victoria 
While we found AV's response time data to be accurate and reliable, it 
has not used best available data to calculate rural response times. This 
means the statewide performance results for 2013–14 are likely 
overstated by 1 to 2 per cent. 
AV provides its response time data to DHHS for inclusion in BP3, and 
reports performance in its annual report and internal management 
reports. AV derives its response time data from two sources—the 
Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority's (ESTA) Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD) system statewide, and the Patient Care Record (PCR) for rural locations.  
PCR data is less robust than ESTA's CAD data, because:  
• it is generated by paramedics using their own watches 
• times are entered after the incident response is complete and therefore may be 
an estimate 
• response times are recorded in whole minutes only.  
In comparison, CAD uses real-time date/time stamping to record when each phase of 
the response occurred, in increments of one second.  
Photograph courtesy 
of Ambulance 
Victoria. 
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Performance against response time targets is consistently worse according to CAD 
data than PCR data. For example, according to PCR data, AV achieved 67.1 per cent 
of its responses in the target time for rural locations in the last quarter of 2013–14, but 
CAD data showed this as only 59.6 per cent. For 2013–14, CAD data shows rural 
ambulance response times that are, on average, approximately one minute slower 
than the times recorded in the PCR system, translating to a drop in statewide 
performance of close to 2 per cent from what was publicly reported. 
CAD data has been available for all rural locations since August 2011. Despite AV 
advice given both internally and to DHHS, both AV and DHHS have continued to report 
performance externally using rural PCR data. However, AV advised that from 
December 2014 it will use CAD data for rural locations as well as urban and will 
publicly release CAD-based rural response data on a quarterly basis. A report on 
response times published on AV's website in January 2015 uses CAD data. 
With the exception of the PCR system, AV's data systems have sufficient controls. AV 
has a robust data governance framework in place, as well as a monthly audit process 
to check the accuracy of data. AV is currently working on improving its data 
governance framework further by strengthening its data governance committee, 
drafting reporting rules and calculation methods, and creating a reports register and 
data dictionary. 
AV's business rules are clear and easy to understand, and we were able to reproduce 
figures consistent with those DHHS has reported in BP3 using AV's rules and datasets. 
Our tests for completeness found that AV response time data used for performance 
reports was a comprehensive record of incidents responded to, and our accuracy 
checks did not identify any errors.  
3.3.3 Department of Justice & Regulation 
DJR does not have sufficient controls to assure the accuracy of the emergency 
response time performance reported in BP3. This has led to minor errors.  
DJR is responsible for collecting and collating performance data from Justice portfolio 
agencies for inclusion in BP3. The Justice BP3 response time measures include 
structure fire responses (CFA and MFESB), road accident rescue responses (SES, 
CFA and MFESB) and emergency medical responses (MFESB).  
Prior to this audit, DJR had very few controls over the data it collected from agencies 
for BP3 reporting. DJR has not provided sufficient guidance to agencies on how to 
count and report response time results, or checked agency submissions thoroughly for 
consistency and errors.  
We found a number of errors in DJR's treatment of agency data for response time 
performance that have led to minor inaccuracies of 1 to 2 per cent in reported 
response time performance in BP3:   
• DJR did not follow its own guidance for collating joint agency measures, which 
states that it should weight agency performance according to the volume of 
activity undertaken. 
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• DJR did not notice that agencies sometimes reported figures as year-to-date, and 
sometimes only for the relevant quarter. 
• DJR incorrectly recorded MFESB's emergency medical response performance for 
the fourth quarter of 2013–14 as 89 per cent, rather than 95 per cent. As a result, 
DJR understated MFESB's total performance for 2013–14 to DTF as 
93.5 per cent, rather than 95 per cent. 
DJR knew of its control weaknesses prior to this audit. A 2011 internal audit report by 
DJR identified significant control weaknesses around BP3 data, including inaccuracies 
in the data provided by agencies for other measures. There is no evidence that DJR 
implemented any department-wide improvements in response.  
DJR has advised that it will work with its portfolio agencies to improve the quality of 
response time performance information provided for use in BP3, and strengthen 
controls over the data. DJR commenced these improvements in 2014 by: 
• creating new templates with prompts to check for common errors 
• producing improved guidance for agencies 
• forming a working group under Emergency Management Victoria to engage with 
data-related issues. 
3.3.4 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
We found MFESB's structure fire response and emergency medical 
response data to be accurate and reliable. However, MFESB road 
accident rescue response data was less accurate. 
MFESB derives all of its response time data from ESTA's CAD system. 
It reports its response time performance to DJR for inclusion in BP3. It 
also reports its response time performance in its annual report and 
internal management reports. 
MFESB has controls over its response time data and systems to identify errors, such 
as reporting on incidents with unlikely response times. Our tests for completeness 
found that MFESB response time data was a comprehensive record of emergencies it 
responded to. Using MFESB's data and business rules we were also able to replicate 
MFESB’s reported performance for structure fire response and emergency medical 
response.  
However, we identified several issues with MFESB's road accident rescue response 
performance reporting: 
• MFESB changed its counting methodology halfway through 2013–14, meaning 
results could not be compared across the year. 
• A technical issue in 2013–14 led to minor errors in its internal and external 
reports—MFESB advised that this has been rectified. 
• MFESB incorrectly used a target of 13 minutes rather than 13.5 minutes, 
meaning its road accident rescue response time performance was approximately 
3 per cent better than was publically reported. 
Photograph courtesy 
of the Metropolitan 
Fire and Emergency 
Services Board. 
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In addition, we were unable to replicate MFESB’s reported performance for road 
accident rescue response using its data and business rules.  
MFESB does not undertake data quality audits. MFESB commissioned a one-off 
review in 2012 that did not identify any problems with response time data but 
recommended the introduction of routine data audits to guard against error.  
3.3.5 Country Fire Authority 
While we found CFA's response time data to be generally accurate and 
reliable, there are weaknesses in controls which led to some minor 
inaccuracies, and create the risk of greater errors in the future. In 
particular, CFA should strengthen controls over the calculation of 
response time performance for external reports. 
CFA derives its response time performance data from CAD and other 
ESTA systems and manages the data in its Fire and Incident Reporting 
System. reports on structure fire responses and road accident rescue 
responses to DJR for inclusion in BP3, and in its annual report and internal 
management reports. 
CFA's data system is relatively reliable and comprehensive. Our tests for 
completeness found that CFA response time data was a comprehensive record of 
emergencies it responded to. A 2014 external review found that CFA had high quality 
data systems, but identified a lack of controls over the response time data held in the 
system.  
We identified a number of areas where CFA could improve controls over the accuracy 
of response time data held in its Fire and Incident Reporting System: 
• CFA officers record 'hazard classification' information for each response 
manually. This determines the time target for the response. While we found no 
evidence that CFA staff are deliberately manipulating this field to improve results, 
the lack of controls increases the risk of misreporting. Some CFA regions have 
implemented controls over which classifications staff can select for specific 
locations. Broader adoption of this control would improve the overall reliability of 
response time data. 
• CFA systems do not currently record when CFA officers alter CAD response time 
data. Manual overwriting is necessary when CAD data is missing or faulty. In the 
past year, CFA has manually entered incident start times for at least half of all 
emergency responses, due to a technical fault leaving this field blank in CAD. 
• CFA does not undertake regular audits of the response time data used for internal 
and external reporting. 
Although the response time data in CFA's system was generally accurate, the use of 
this data to create external reports has been inconsistent and flawed. 
Photograph courtesy 
of the Country Fire 
Authority. 
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CFA did not have documented business rules for calculating results against BP3 
measures until after this audit commenced, and only a few CFA staff members 
understood how results were calculated. Even after CFA developed business rules we 
could not easily audit or fully replicate CFA's BP3 reporting on response times by 
applying those rules to agency data. 
In particular, CFA has not been consistent in its selection of the structure fire and road 
accident rescue incidents that it includes in reports on response times. For example, 
BP3 results published in the CFA Annual Report incorrectly included 968 structure fire 
responses that had been excluded from BP3 reports provided to DJR—leading to an 
error of 1 per cent in reported performance. Although the lack of controls in the 
reporting process did not cause material errors in this instance, they do highlight the 
potential for greater misreporting. CFA has recognised these issues and has begun 
codifying its business rules and reporting practices. 
3.3.6 Victoria State Emergency Service 
SES response time data is lacking in sufficient controls to provide 
adequate assurance of accuracy. While SES derives some of its data 
from the ESTA CAD system, it generates response time data from 
manual reporting by staff and volunteers. SES reports on its road 
accident rescue response times to DJR for inclusion in the BP3 report, 
and in its annual report and internal management reports. 
The CAD system can only track and record the status of entire SES 
units rather than individual vehicles, which means that response times 
are not accurately recorded. In addition, responders do not have access to real time 
date/time stamping or automated time-capture technology that is available, for 
example, in ambulance vehicles. They therefore have to rely on their own timepieces 
such as pagers, watches and mobile phones, which are not necessarily synchronised. 
As a result, recorded times are in whole minutes only, and reports may be filled in 
weeks or months after an incident. In 2013–14, 56 per cent of road accident rescue 
reports were completed within a week, and 80 per cent within a month.  
SES has recognised this as an issue and worked proactively with regional staff and 
volunteers to improve both the time capture systems available and the reporting 
activities of its staff and volunteers. The rate of incident reports completed within 
28 days has improved from 63 per cent in 2010–11 to 77 per cent in 2013–14. In 
addition, SES is continuing work started in 2011 to enable the tracking of individual 
vehicles and their response times through the CAD system. This could improve data 
controls significantly, as SES could potentially then use CAD data rather than manually 
recorded data. 
SES has systems in place to identify whether incidents that do not achieve response 
time targets are correctly recorded. However, it has never undertaken audits of the 
quality of response time data. 
Photograph courtesy 
of the Victoria State 
Emergency Service. 
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Our testing to match SES data against ESTA CAD data found only minimal cases 
missing from the SES data. Further testing found two minor issues with the SES 
response time data:  
• in 2013–14 data, 2 per cent of recorded incidents had response times and 
locations that indicated vehicles had travelled at average speeds of over 
150 km/h 
• a further 4 per cent of incidents in the same dataset recorded incorrect travel 
distances.   
Although these issues are unlikely to have significantly changed the reported 
performance, they are illustrative of the types of errors that can occur in the absence of 
sufficient controls. 
3.3.7 Victoria Police 
As with other ESOs, ESTA's CAD system records response time 
information for Victoria Police. Around one-third of frontline 
operational police cars have mobile data terminals, like those used 
in ambulances, which allow for automatic capture of arrival times. 
While Victoria Police has policies and processes requiring 
members to report their status when responding to an incident, it 
does not apply quality assurance controls to the data, such as data 
audits or error checking.     
Due to the lack of controls, Victoria Police response time data is not currently reliable 
enough for external reporting. Victoria Police has not undertaken in-depth analysis of 
the shortcomings in the data, as it does not currently use the data for either internal or 
external reporting. Limitations to existing response time data include: 
• police members do not always notify ESTA when they arrive at an incident as 
required by Victoria Police policy 
• radio congestion can prevent police members without access to mobile data 
terminals from being able to report their status to ESTA promptly and easily. 
However, our testing of the data found that it was complete enough to be useful for 
internal reporting and monitoring: 
• In 2012–13 and 2013–14, 75 per cent of Priority 1 responses—excluding those 
which the police member was unable to locate, or which were cancelled 
en route—had dispatch and arrival times recorded. 
• The distribution of the Priority 1 response times followed the expected pattern. 
• Average response times appear to be relatively consistent over the period 
analysed—2012–13 to 2013–14. 
Photograph courtesy 
of ChameleonsEye / 
Shutterstock.com. 
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3.4 Consistency across agencies 
DJR aggregates performance from different agencies in BP3 reporting for two 
response types—structure fire responses and road accident rescue responses. ESOs 
that contribute to these shared measures use significantly different methods to 
calculate how long their responses to the same kinds of emergencies take. This can 
make some agencies appear faster, and others slower, simply because of the counting 
methods they use. 
Structure fire responses 
Structure fire response is a joint CFA and MFESB measure and they are largely 
consistent in how they calculate their performance. CFA and MFESB have slightly 
different approaches to when they start counting their response times, but these have 
a negligible impact on performance. CFA starts counting its response time from when a 
brigade successfully receives a dispatch notice from ESTA. MFESB starts counting 
slightly earlier, including a small portion of the time taken by ESTA to process Triple 
Zero calls—15 seconds on average in 2013–14. 
Road accident rescue responses  
Road accident rescue response is a joint CFA, MFESB and SES measure. As outlined 
in Part 2 of this report, targets and measures are defined under the State Road 
Rescue Arrangements (the Arrangements). However, as these Arrangements lack 
detail, ESOs have set their own business rules for what incidents to include, what 
targets they should apply and how to calculate response times. This has led to 
significant differences in the way CFA, MFESB and SES measure their road accident 
rescue performance: 
• MFESB excludes road accident rescue responses where there are no fatalities or 
injuries, or where no rescue ends up being required, while the other agencies do 
not. 
• Until 2013–14, MFESB counted all responses to road accident rescue incidents 
attended by all vehicles, but now counts only those attended by a vehicle 
approved for road accident rescue. CFA and SES have always counted only 
those attended by a vehicle approved for road accident rescue.   
• CFA and MFESB count all unit responses—both primary and support—while SES 
counts only primary responses. 
• The Arrangements provide different target times for volunteers and paid staff: 
• MFESB's target allows one-and-a-half-minutes for staff to receive a dispatch 
notification and begin travelling to the incident, on the basis that it has paid 
staff, not volunteers 
• SES, as a volunteer organisation, allows eight minutes  
• CFA allows eight minutes for both volunteers and paid staff but has not 
provided a rationale for this decision.  
• MFESB and CFA exclude call-processing time from their response time targets, 
while SES includes call-processing time of four minutes.  
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These differences mean that response time performance results change depending on 
which agency's methodology is used. For example, if SES excluded ESTA's 
call-processing component from its response time target, consistent with CFA and 
MFESB, its 2013–14 performance would drop from 91 to 88 per cent.  
It is important that calculation methods used for shared measures are consistent, so 
that the aggregated result is meaningful.   
Recommendations 
5. That the Department of Health & Human Services uses Emergency Services 
Telecommunications Authority Computer Aided Dispatch data to report 
ambulance emergency response time performance.  
6. That the Department of Health & Human Services and Department of Justice & 
Regulation verify that response time data used in their reports on output 
performance measures is accurate and auditable. 
7. That the Department of Justice & Regulation applies a consistent approach to 
emergency response time measures including data capture, calculation and 
reporting. 
8. That the Country Fire Authority, Victoria State Emergency Service and 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board improve controls over response 
time data collection and reporting. 
9. That Victoria Police assesses and where practical addresses limitations to 
available data and trials the use of response times for internal performance 
measurement.  
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4  Understanding response time performance 
At a glance 
Background  
We examined the extent to which agencies met targets for response times. To provide 
Parliament and the public with a better understanding of response time performance, 
we also assessed how long actual responses have taken. In addition, we examined 
how agencies use response time information to drive improvement and inform 
government and the public.  
Conclusion 
Emergency service organisations have generally met response time targets, except for 
Ambulance Victoria (AV), and statewide performance has been relatively stable over 
the past three years. The agencies that measure response times use this information 
to drive improvement, although some do not report sufficient detail to senior 
management. External reporting is too limited to provide a true understanding of 
performance. 
Findings  
• Response times for 90 per cent of statewide emergencies range from 7.8 minutes 
for urban structure fires to 27.0 minutes for statewide road accident rescues. 
• Response time performance varies between regions. 
• With the exception of Victoria Police, agencies use response time information to 
inform improvements but there are still opportunities to improve trend reporting 
and analysis of results. 
• External reports on response time performance lack times, trends, regional 
variation and analysis of the factors driving performance. 
Recommendation 
That AV, the Country Fire Authority, Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
and Victoria State Emergency Service improve transparency of public reporting on 
response times by including regional performance, times, trends and analysis on 
factors affecting performance. 
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4.1 Introduction 
State Budget Paper 3 (BP3) sets out response time expectations for Victorian 
emergency service organisations (ESO) through timeliness output measures and 
targets. Part 2 of this report discusses the quality of these measures and targets in 
detail. This Part assesses the extent to which ESOs have met those expectations and 
provides an analysis of recent response time performance.  
As outlined in Part 2, current response time measures and targets do not offer 
meaningful insight into response time performance. Therefore, in addition to assessing 
agencies against their targets, we also examined the actual time it takes ESOs to 
respond to 50 and 90 per cent of Code 1 or Priority 1 emergency cases and how this 
performance has trended over the past three years.  
Response time performance reports should help agencies identify areas for 
improvement and inform resource and operational decisions. This information also 
helps the public to understand how long emergency responses are taking. We 
therefore examined how agencies report response time performance both internally 
and externally, the extent to which reported information allows the user to assess the 
agency's actual performance, and how agencies act on response time performance 
information. 
4.2 Conclusion 
With the exception of Ambulance Victoria (AV), which has not met its BP3 response 
time targets since it was created in 2008, all the other audited ESOs have consistently 
met or nearly met their targets. However, given the lack of evidence supporting these 
targets, it is not clear whether these results show 'good' or 'poor' performance.  
Although statewide performance has been relatively stable over the past three years, 
response time performance varies significantly between regions. 
Public reports on emergency response times do not provide enough information for the 
public and Parliament to understand performance. They are almost entirely limited to 
stating the proportion of cases that met targets and lack critical information such as 
actual response times, trends in performance, regional variation and analysis of the 
factors driving performance. This represents a missed opportunity to respond to public 
concern about response times and for ESOs to help citizens understand how long a 
response to their emergency is likely to take.  
Although agencies that measure response times generally communicate this 
performance well internally, there are opportunities to improve the information provided 
to senior management and to take further action on trends in performance. Victoria 
Police would benefit from a better understanding of response time performance to 
inform its improvement initiatives. 
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4.3 Response time performance  
To provide Parliament and the public with a better understanding of how long ESOs 
take to respond to emergencies we used Emergency Services Telecommunications 
Authority (ESTA) Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data to calculate response times at 
the 50th and 90th percentiles. This information is useful as it shows the actual number 
of minutes it takes agencies to respond to 50 and 90 per cent of all Code 1 or Priority 1 
cases, allowing users to understand how long a response is likely to take. 
Performance for each agency and measure has remained relatively stable between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
Figure 4A shows agencies' performance against BP3 targets as well as urban and 
rural subcategories for road accident rescues that contribute to the statewide BP3 
measures, but are not separately reported. Figure 4A also shows agency performance 
for 50 and 90 per cent of cases for 2013–14. With the exception of AV, all other 
agencies met or were close to target in 2013–14.  
   Figure 4A
Emergency response time performance 2013–14 
Type of emergency response Target  
Per cent 
within 
target 
50th 
percentile 
(mins) 
90th 
percentile 
(mins) 
Department of Justice & Regulation (DJR) 
Structure fire response—applies to Country Fire 
Authority (CFA) and Metropolitan Fire and 
Emergency Services Board (MFESB)(a)  
90% meeting 
agency time 
targets 
89 5.4 7.8 
Road accident rescue response—applies to 
Victoria State Emergency Service (SES), CFA 
and MFESB(a) 
90% meeting 
agency time 
targets 
91 13.1 27.0 
Emergency medical response—applies to 
MFESB  
90% meeting 
agency time 
targets 
95 5.8  8.3  
Country Fire Authority  
Structure fire response—medium urban, hazard 
classification 2 
90% within 
8 minutes 
87 5.6  8.6  
Road accident rescue response—statewide 90% meeting 
benchmarks 
93 13.0 28.7 
Road accident rescue response—urban 90% within 
20 minutes 
93 10.6 17.7 
Road accident rescue response—rural 90% within 
40 minutes 
93 16.6 31.3 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
Structure fire response 90% within 
7.7 minutes 
89 5.6  7.8  
Road accident rescue response 90% within 
13.5 minutes 
89 9.5 14.5 
Emergency medical response 90% within 
9.2 minutes 
95 5.8  8.3  
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Figure 4A 
Emergency response time performance 2013–14 – continued 
Type of emergency response Target  
Per cent 
within 
target 
50th 
percentile 
(mins) 
90th 
percentile 
(mins) 
Victoria State Emergency Service  
Road accident rescue response—statewide 90% meeting 
benchmarks 
91 16.0 31.0 
Road accident rescue response—urban 90% within 
24 minutes 
88 14.0  25.0  
Road accident rescue response—rural 90% within 
44 minutes 
94 18.5  36.0  
Victoria Police  
Code 1 incidents No target No target 7.3  20.6  
Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) and AV 
Code 1 incidents—statewide 85% within 
15 minutes 
74 11.1  22.4  
Code 1 incidents—in centres with a population 
greater than 7 500 
90% within 
15 minutes 
79 10.8 19.6 
(a) For consistency, DJR-collated figures exclude call-processing time, as per CFA's counting 
methodology. 
Note: Times across different agencies are not directly comparable due to differences in resourcing, 
regions serviced, operating models and whether agency measures include call-processing time that 
involves ESTA. 
Note: Some figures in Figure 4A differ from those publically reported because of counting errors in 
the publicly-reported figures, as outlined in Part 3 of this report. 
Note: Performance within target is drawn from ESO annual reports, agency datasets and, for DJR, 
from reporting to Department of Treasury and Finance 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
Time taken to respond 
Response times vary widely depending on agency, location and type of emergency, for 
example: 
• results for agency response times to 50 and 90 per cent of Code 1 and Priority 1 
emergencies show longer times for rural responses, reflecting the greater 
distances travelled 
• responses to structure fires are significantly faster than other emergency types  
• statewide road rescue responses for 90 per cent of cases are slower than 
responses to other emergency types. 
These variations may be due to factors other than simply performance of the task, 
such as differences in resourcing, agency size and use of volunteer or paid staff.   
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4.4 Agency response time performance 
4.4.1 Ambulance Victoria 
AV response times for Code 1 emergencies are consistently longer than the target of 
15 minutes. Its performance has been stable since January 2012, fluctuating around 
22 minutes for 90 per cent of cases statewide after an increase from around 
19 minutes in July 2009. Performance for centres with a population greater than 7 500 
has also been stable since January 2012, at around 19 minutes. 
  Figure 4B
AV Code 1 response times for 90 percent of cases (minutes) 
  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data and applying AV business rules. 
AV's Code 1 response time varies between regional areas. Figure 4C shows, for 
example, that Loddon Mallee and Barwon South West outperform Hume and 
Gippsland. Hume's response times in particular, have increased since January 2012.  
Response times also vary significantly between urban centre locations. For example, 
2013–14 results show that: 
• 50 per cent of Code 1 emergencies in Wallan and Drouin waited more than 
15 minutes for an ambulance to arrive  
• 90 per cent of Code 1 emergencies in Drouin, Castlemaine, Benalla and Colac 
waited 30 minutes or more. 
These examples of variation across Victoria demonstrate the need for regional level 
reporting to allow Victorians to understand response time performance in their area. 
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  Figure 4C
AV Code 1 response times for 90 per cent of cases by region (minutes) 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from AV performance reports to DHHS. 
Using response time performance to drive improvement 
AV uses response time information to drive organisational and local level performance 
and shares detailed performance information throughout the organisation. 
AV undertakes detailed analysis of its response performance and thoroughly 
understands the drivers of its response times, which include:  
• ambulance supply 
• increasing demand 
• travel time and time spent at the scene  
• turnaround time between ambulance arrival at and departure from a hospital 
emergency department.  
Industrial issues also affect AV's response time, particularly the timing of shifts and 
meal breaks which cause performance dips at particular times of the day.  
AV uses response time information to inform resourcing decisions and service 
improvements. AV, together with DHHS is implementing a range of measures to 
improve AV operations and response times including:  
• a new funding model 
• governance improvements 
• plans to revise the call-taking script to enable better patient prioritisation 
• diversion strategies such as better use of non-emergency transport.  
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These initiatives are too recent to have had an impact on response times at the time of 
publication of this report. 
One joint AV and DHHS initiative—the Hospital Transfer Taskforce—designed to 
improve hospital turnaround time, is having some positive effect. At July 2012, the 
turnaround time for Code 1 emergencies was around 60 minutes on average. The 
initiative involves setting guidelines and expectations for hospital staff to encourage 
them to support ambulances to leave the emergency department within 40 minutes. 
DHHS monitors performance of this measure closely, and performance has improved 
from 75 per cent of transfers occurring within 40 minutes in July 2012, to 89 per cent in 
June 2014. 
In regards to local and regional level performance, AV advised that resourcing is the 
main cause of variation. AV's 2015–16 Emergency Operations Plan, produced in 
2012–13, proposes additional resources to support areas requiring response time 
improvements, however, AV advises it has not yet been able to put these in place. 
4.4.2 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
MFESB has consistently met or come close to meeting its target for Code 1 structure 
fire response and emergency medical response performance measures, the targets 
being 7.7 and 9.2 minutes respectively. However, response times to road accident 
rescues show greater levels of variation against the target of 13.5 minutes, with 
MFESB failing to meet that target by over a minute in two quarters of 2013–14. Figure 
4D shows MFESB response times for 90 per cent of Code 1 cases across its three 
measures–structure fires, road accident rescues and emergency medical responses. 
  Figure 4D
MFESB Code 1 response times for 90 per cent of cases (minutes) 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data and applying MFESB business 
rules. 
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  Figure 4E
Per cent of Code 1 responses by MFESB meeting target  
by metropolitan district, 2013–14  
  
Note: Includes all Code 1 responses such as structure fires, road accident rescues, explosions 
and hazardous material spills. MFESB measures emergency medical responses and road 
accident rescues against their BP3 targets, and all other responses against the 7.7 minute target 
for structure fires. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from MFESB internal performance reports. 
Figure 4E shows that MFESB response times for all Code 1 incidents, which include 
structure fires and road accident rescues, vary between metropolitan regions. The 
central district was consistently the best performing in 2013–14, achieving target for 
well over 90 per cent of responses. However, the northern and in particular, the 
western district have performed significantly worse since at least January 2012.  
Using response time performance to drive improvement 
MFESB uses response time information to inform organisation-level improvement 
initiatives and communicates performance information well internally. However, 
MFESB is not undertaking work to address regional variation. 
MFESB reports on emergency response times for structure fires at an executive level 
quarterly, including trend data and regional and station level data. MFESB also reports 
response time performance to regional staff and management, and firefighters have 
access to live broadcasting of real time countdowns against response time targets. 
This was a 2010 initiative to improve turnout times. Emergency response times 
improved as a result of the project, rising from 84.1 per cent meeting MFESB's internal 
targets in 2009–10 to 87.3 per cent in 2010–11.  
MFESB acknowledges the variation in performance across districts and as a result of 
the audit has begun implementing a number of actions aimed at better understanding 
the reasons for the variation and targeting areas for improvement. 
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4.4.3 Country Fire Authority  
CFA responds to emergencies at, or close to, target response times. Figure 4F shows 
that since January 2012, responses to structure fires in urban areas—Hazard 
Classification 2—have fluctuated just above the eight minute BP3 target. Figure 4F 
also shows performance for types of fires that are not included in BP3 reporting—
Hazard Classifications 3 'low urban' and 4 'rural'—which have internal CFA targets of 
10 and 20 minutes respectively. Performance for Hazard Classification 3 fluctuates just 
above the 10 minute target and Hazard Classification 4 responses usually meet the 
20-minute target.  
  Figure 4F
CFA Code 1 response times for 90 per cent of structure fires (minutes) 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data and applying CFA business 
rules. 
For road accident rescues, CFA consistently arrives within targets of 20 minutes in 
urban areas and 40 minutes in rural areas. Figure 4G shows that response times are 
increasing, with the urban response trend nearing the target time.  
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  Figure 4G
CFA Code 1 response times for 90 per cent of road accident rescues 
(minutes) 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data and applying CFA business 
rules. 
Using response time performance to drive improvement 
CFA uses response time information effectively to inform action on performance 
variations at the local level.  
However, CFA has done little reporting or analysis of statewide response time trends or 
organisation-level reasons for underperformance. This lack of regular  
organisation-wide analysis makes it harder for CFA to identify performance trends, 
such as the increase in road accident rescue response times. In February 2015, CFA 
introduced new Board-level reporting that now contains analysis of response time 
performance.  
In contrast, CFA analyses local and regional response times and acts on results. CFA 
examines brigade-level response times thoroughly as part of operational planning and 
performance monitoring, including detailed reporting on performance variations. 
Management uses this response time data in conjunction with other performance and 
resource metrics to produce annual reports on brigade viability for senior management. 
Individual brigades and regions also use response time performance to inform 
resourcing, rostering or volunteer recruitment. 
Based on its understanding of response time performance, CFA has undertaken 
targeted interventions including: 
• adjusting ESTA protocols in specific regions to ensure the most appropriate 
brigades are dispatched 
• planning for new station locations 
• adjusting the balance of career firefighters and volunteer personnel in particular 
brigades. 
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In February 2014, CFA commissioned an external review of its internal and external 
performance framework. This has included seeking better alignment between agency 
objectives and performance measures and targets, and is also considering what role 
response time information should play in both internal and external reporting.  
4.4.4 Victoria State Emergency Service 
SES has achieved its external response time targets since the road accident rescue 
BP3 measure was introduced in 2012–13. SES response times for road accident 
rescues consistently meet the 44 minute target for rural responses, and fluctuate 
around the 24 minute target for urban responses. Performance has been reasonably 
consistent from January 2012 to June 2014.  
  Figure 4H
SES Code 1 response times for 90 per cent of road accident rescues 
(minutes) 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data and applying SES business 
rules. 
Using response time performance to drive improvement 
SES uses response time information to drive improvements at a local level, but could 
use it more effectively to drive organisation-level strategies and initiatives.  
SES has two ongoing initiatives to drive response time improvement at a local level: 
• a partnership with CFA where the two agencies jointly review unit response times 
on a six-monthly basis to consider the best dispatch options for road accident 
rescue  
• monthly exception reporting to regional staff identifies units that have failed to 
achieve response time targets—SES then puts plans in place for units that fail 
consistently, and monitors the plans for effectiveness.  
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SES regularly reports to the board, executive and regional staff on performance 
against the BP3 road accident rescue target. However, it does not undertake trend 
analysis to allow for the assessment of performance and factors driving 
underperformance over time.  
4.4.5 Victoria Police 
Victoria Police has no response time targets, therefore we cannot assess whether it is 
meeting expectations. However, our analysis of ESTA CAD data capturing police 
dispatch and arrival times shows that the Victoria Police response time of 7.3 minutes 
to 50 per cent of Priority 1 cases is comparable to the other ESOs, as shown in 
Figure 4A. Figure 4I shows Victoria Police response times to 50 and 90 per cent of 
Priority 1 cases.  
  Figure 4I
Victoria Police Priority 1 response times for 50 and 90 per cent of cases 
(minutes) 
 
Note: Excludes response times for Wangaratta from July until November 2012. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from ESTA CAD data. 
CAD data for Victoria Police shows a large number of responses recorded as taking 
over 60 minutes. This may reflect poor data capture, but may also support Victoria 
Police advice that responding units have discretion to re-prioritise cases categorised 
as Priority 1 by ESTA, based on their own assessment of urgency. As Victoria Police 
does not specifically collect response time data for reporting, and does not have 
systems to support accurate data capture, the response times reported here are only a 
broad guide to performance and may not accurately represent actual performance. 
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Using response time performance to drive improvement 
Although Victoria Police records arrival times, it does not collate this information or 
undertake any analysis of it across the organisation. Therefore, it cannot use the 
information to inform improvement initiatives or resourcing decisions. This is despite a 
number of strategic and corporate documents referring to improved response times as 
a desired outcome. As discussed in Part 2 of this report, Victoria Police should make 
better use of existing response time data to inform internal understanding of response 
time performance, and to identify and implement improvement initiatives and 
resourcing decisions.  
4.5 Reporting response times transparently 
Solely reporting a percentage of statewide cases meeting an annual target does not 
provide readers with enough information to understand actual performance. It does not 
explain whether this performance is improving or declining, what the actual 
performance was or what factors underpin performance variations. VAGO has 
developed good practice criteria for use in our audits of agency performance reports. 
We used these criteria to assess both departmental and ESO public reports on 
response time performance. 
Information showing how long ESOs take to respond to most emergencies, regional 
variations and trends over time is not publicly available. MFESB is an exception and in 
December 2014, AV released regional and local-level response times. BP3 and agency 
annual reports do not explain what reported data includes or excludes, provide 
sufficient explanations of the reasons for results, and do not always reveal what the 
actual target times are. Reports do not allow the reader to understand how long a 
response might take in their area or whether performance is stable, improving or 
declining. Such information is necessary for Parliament and the public to gain a 
transparent understanding of ESO response time performance. 
4.5.1 Budget Paper 3 
DHHS and DJR annually publish ESO emergency response time performance in BP3. 
These reports show the percentage of Code 1 or Priority 1 cases meeting the 
response time target. Figure 4J shows the response time information from the 
2014–15 BP3. 
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  Figure 4J
2014–15 BP3 emergency response time reporting (per cent) 
Response time measure 
2014–15 
target 
2013–14 
expected 
outcome 
2013–14 
target 
2012–13 
actual 
Department of Justice & Regulation 
Structure fire response 90 89.2 90 90 
Road accident rescue response 90 89.8 90 90 
Emergency medical response 90 95.4(a) 90 95 
Department of Health & Human Services 
Proportion of Code 1 emergency 
incidents responded to within 
15 minutes – statewide 
85 73.4(b) 85 73 
Proportion of Code 1 emergency 
incidents responded to within 
15 minutes in centres with more 
than 7 500 population 
90 78.2(b) 90 78.1 
(a) The 2013–14 expected outcome is higher than the 2013–14 target due to the MFESB 
exceeding its required benchmark targets for emergency medical responses. 
(b) The 2013–14 expected outcome is lower than the 2013–14 target due to a range of 
interrelated factors including growing incident demand, case complexity and hospital transfer 
times. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from 2014–15 Budget Paper 3. 
As Figure 4J shows, BP3 reporting does not show: 
• which agencies contribute to DJR emergency response time measures 
• what the targets are for MFESB, CFA and SES that underpin the DJR measures 
• which 'levels' of responses are included—for example reporting against structure 
fires excludes CFA Hazard Classifications 3 and 4 
• what the response times are for the majority of cases 
• a comparison over time beyond the previous year. 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Country Fire Authority. 
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4.5.2 Agency public reporting 
Annual reports and websites are important tools for agencies to communicate their 
performance to the public. However, we found that they are not providing sufficient 
detail to allow the public to understand emergency response time performance. This is 
a missed opportunity to communicate expectations and explain the context of 
response time results.  
With the exception of MFESB, none of the agencies provide information on the actual 
time they take to respond to the majority of emergency cases. MFESB does this by 
reporting the time taken to respond to 50 and 90 per cent of Code 1 cases. This allows 
the public to understand, for example, that a response to a house fire in Melbourne will 
most likely arrive in under eight minutes.  
Only MFESB and AV report how their performance against target has trended over 
time. This is important information as it places current performance in context, 
revealing whether performance is stable, improving or declining. 
Agency annual reports and websites also do not report on regional level performance. 
Transparent reporting should make clear to the public the different response time 
expectations and results across Victoria. In December 2014, AV released regional-level 
response times for the first time, despite VAGO recommending this approach in its 
2010 audit of Access to Ambulance Services. 
Finally, agency annual reports and websites provide limited detail, if any, to explain 
reported performance, such as: 
• how results are calculated 
• inclusions or exclusions 
• major factors affecting results. 
This information would allow Parliament and the public to better assess emergency 
service performance, and help service users understand how long responses in their 
area are likely to take and whether performance is improving or declining. 
Recommendation 
10. That Ambulance Victoria, Country Fire Authority, Metropolitan Fire and 
Emergency Services Board and Victoria State Emergency Service improve the 
transparency of public reporting on response times by including regional 
performance, times, trends and analysis of the factors affecting performance. 
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 Appendix A. 
 Definitions of measures 
 Figure A1
Dispatch and response process 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
Figure A1 shows the main phases in the dispatch and response process. Different 
agencies begin counting their response time at different points in the process, as 
outlined in Figure A2. 
 Figure A2
Definition of measures 
Measure Definition 
Target 
Minutes Per cent 
Justice portfolio   
Department of Justice & Regulation Budget Paper 3 measures   
Structure fire response—applies 
to the Country Fire Authority 
(CFA) and the Metropolitan Fire 
and Emergency Services Board 
(MFESB) 
Statewide. 
Fires inside a building or structure. Business 
rules for calculating response times vary 
between agencies. 
Varies by 
agency 
90 
Road accident rescue 
response—applies to the 
Victoria State Emergency 
Service (SES), CFA and MFESB 
Statewide. 
The release and extrication of trapped people 
from motor vehicles. Business rules for 
calculating response times vary between 
agencies.  
Varies by 
agency 
90 
Emergency medical response—
applies to MFESB 
Metropolitan District. 
Provided by MFESB in support of ambulance 
responses for cardiac arrests and non-breathing 
patients. 
Response time is calculated from the ESTA 
dispatch operator accepting the call to arrival on 
scene of the first vehicle.  
9.2 90 
Call processing
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Figure A2 
Definition of measures – continued 
 
Measure Definition 
Target 
Minutes Per cent 
Justice Portfolio – continued   
CFA benchmarks and agency-level measures 
Structure fire response—Hazard 
Classification 2(a) 
Outside the Metropolitan District.  
Medium urban hazard: significant urban areas, 
primarily residential areas involving commercial 
centres, clusters of industrial and/or institutional 
hazards. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
8 90 
Structure fire response—Hazard 
Classification 3(b) 
Outside the Metropolitan District. 
Low urban hazard: all structural hazards in 
urban areas not falling into Hazard Classification 
2 and includes predominantly residential 
occupancies and small industries. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
10 90 
Structure fire response—Hazard 
Classification 4(b) 
Outside the Metropolitan District. 
Rural hazard: primarily involves natural 
surroundings in terms of fuel, but also involves 
isolated dwellings and structures within those 
areas. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
20 90 
Structure fire response—Hazard 
Classification 5(b) 
Outside the Metropolitan District. 
Remote rural hazard: structural and rural 
hazards similar to Classification 4 and for which 
the location of the hazard is geographically 
distant from a fire station. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
No target No target 
Road accident rescue 
response—urban zone 
The Melbourne Statistical Division, plus the 
municipal districts of Greater Geelong, Greater 
Bendigo, Ballarat, Latrobe and Greater 
Shepparton. 
A road vehicle accident in CFA territory, which 
the CFA attended, and there was a rescue 
performed. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
20 90 
Road accident rescue 
response—rural zone  
The part of Victoria not in the urban zone. 
A road vehicle accident in CFA territory, which 
the CFA attended, and there was a rescue 
performed. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
40 90 
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Figure A2 
Definition of measures – continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure Definition 
Target 
Minutes Per cent 
Justice Portfolio – continued   
MFESB benchmarks and agency-level measures 
Structure fire response The Metropolitan District. 
Fires inside a building or structure. 
Response time is calculated from the ESTA 
dispatch operator accepting the call to arrival on 
scene of the first vehicle.  
7.7 90 
Emergency medical response The Metropolitan District. 
Provided by MFESB in support of ambulance 
responses for cardiac arrests and non-breathing 
patients. 
Response time is calculated from the ESTA 
dispatch operator accepting the call to arrival on 
scene of the first vehicle. 
9.2 90 
Road accident rescue response The Metropolitan District.  
An accident or incident involving a motor vehicle 
and in which there are injuries or assistance is 
required from emergency services 
organisations. 
Response time is calculated from dispatch of 
agency to arrival on scene of the first vehicle. 
13.5 90 
SES benchmarks and agency-level measures 
Road accident rescue 
response—urban zone 
The Melbourne Statistical Division, plus the 
municipal districts of Greater Geelong, Greater 
Bendigo, Ballarat, La Trobe and Greater 
Shepparton. 
Response time is calculated from the time ESTA 
receives the call until the arrival on scene by 
two trained crew and an appropriately equipped 
road rescue vehicle.  
20 90 
Road accident rescue 
response—rural zone 
The part of Victoria not in the urban zone. 
Response time is calculated from the time ESTA 
receives the call until the arrival on scene by 
two trained crew and an appropriately equipped 
road rescue vehicle. 
40 90 
Victoria Police    
No external measures of 
response times 
  No target 
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Figure A2 
Definition of measures – continued 
Measure Definition 
Target 
Minutes Per cent 
Health portfolio   
Department of Health & Human Services Budget Paper 3 measures—reporting Ambulance Victoria (AV) 
performance 
Proportion of emergency  
(Code 1) incidents responded to 
within 15 minutes—statewide 
Time from call being answered by ESTA to the 
time of the first arrival at the incident scene of 
an AV paramedic, a Community Emergency 
Response Team or an Ambulance Community 
Officer. 
15 85 
Proportion of emergency (Code 1) 
incidents responded to within 
15 minutes—centres with 
population greater than 7 500 
As above. 15 90 
(a) CFA Hazard Classification 1 was discontinued in 1998. Activity previously included in Hazard Classification 1—high 
urban is now reported in Hazard Classification 2. 
(b) These measures are monitored internally but not reported in Budget Paper 3. 
Source: Justice agencies: MFESB, CFA and SES correspondence to VAGO.  
Ambulance Victoria: Victorian Health Service Performance Monitoring Framework 2013–14.  
 Figure A3
Agency definitions of Code 1 or Priority 1 incidents 
Agency Definition 
CFA Incidents requiring time critical attendance as there is an immediate threat to 
life or property. 
MFESB Incidents requiring a lights and sirens response. 
SES Life-threatening incidents such as rescues requiring an immediate response. 
Victoria Police Urgent response involving threat to life or serious injury, real or imminent 
danger, violence or any incident on freeways. 
AV Time-critical cases with a lights and sirens ambulance response. Priority 0 is 
a subset of Code 1 cases that are potentially life-threatening, such as cardiac 
arrests. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from correspondence with agencies. 
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Appendix B. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16A and 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report, or 
relevant extracts from the report, was provided to the Department of Health & Human 
Services, the Department of Justice & Regulation, Ambulance Victoria, the 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board, the Country Fire Authority, the 
Victoria State Emergency Service, Victoria Police and the Emergency Services 
Telecommunications Authority with a request for submissions or comments. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Department of Health & Human Services ................................................................... 54 
Department of Justice & Regulation ............................................................................ 57 
Ambulance Victoria ..................................................................................................... 60 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board ...................................................... 62 
Country Fire Authority ................................................................................................. 63 
Victoria State Emergency Service ............................................................................... 65 
Victoria Police ............................................................................................................. 71   
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services 
– continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services 
– continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice & Regulation 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice & Regulation – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice & Regulation – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Administrator, Ambulance Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Administrator, Ambulance Victoria – continued 
   
Appendix B. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
62       Emergency Service Response Times Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Metropolitan Fire and 
Emergency Services Board 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Country Fire Authority 
   
Appendix B. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
64       Emergency Service Response Times Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Country Fire Authority – 
continued 
   
Appendix B. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report Emergency Service Response Times       65 
RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Country Fire Authority – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chair, Victoria State Emergency Service  
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RESPONSE provided by the Chair, Victoria State Emergency Service – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chair, Victoria State Emergency Service – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chair, Victoria State Emergency Service – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chair, Victoria State Emergency Service – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police 
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RESPONSE provided by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police – 
continued 
 
 
 
 
Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2014–15 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Technical and Further Education Institutes: Results of the 2013 Audits (2014–15:1) August 2014 
Coordinating Public Transport (2014–15:2) August 2014 
Managing the Environmental Impacts of Transport (2014–15:3) August 2014 
Access to Legal Aid (2014–15:4) August 2014 
Managing Landfills (2014–15:5) September 2014 
Management and Oversight of the Caulfield Racecourse Reserve (2014–15:6) September 2014 
Effectiveness of Catchment Management Authorities (2014–15:7) September 2014 
Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health (2014–15:8) October 2014 
Emergency Response ICT Systems (2014–15:9) October 2014 
Public Sector Performance Measurement and Reporting (2014–15:10) October 2014 
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